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Thomas Mann's "Tobias Mindernickel" in Light of Sartre's "Being-for-Others"
Abstract
Sartre's analysis of "Being-for-Others" in Being and Nothingness describes the Self-Other relationship as
essentially one of conflict, with the Self attempting either to dominate or to be dominated by the Other.
Subject-Object relations are a common theme also in the early works of Thomas Mann, who gives artistic
expression to many of the same problems which Sartre later formalized in a philosophical theory.
The sado-masochistic character, which is portrayed in several of Thomas Mann's narratives, receives its
strongest expression in the story "Tobias Mindernickel," which is here singled out for analysis. Humiliation
gives rise to aggression, as the protagonist feels both an attraction and a repulsion for his surrogate lover,
a dog. The interpersonal relationships revealed here serve as paradigmatic illustration of Sartre's theory
of "Concrete Relations with Others."
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THOMAS MANN'S "TOBIAS MINDERNICKEL" IN
LIGHT OF SARTRE'S "BEING-FOR-OTHERS"
BETH BJORKLUND

University of Virginia, Charlottesville

Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness proposes not only an
ontology but also a philosophical anthropology which describes the
rational/irrational nature of man's "Concrete Relations with
Others." Interpersonal relations are seen as based on the subject/
object conflict, in which the "I" attempts to turn the "Other" into
an object in order to maintain the subject status of the self. A
principal manifestation of the conflict is, literally or figuratively,
"the look" (le regard), for in "being seen" one becomes painfully
aware of the self and the accompanying guilt, shame, and fear. The
self can, conversely, return the gaze and thus transcend the other's
transcendence. The two poles of human emotions, love and hate,
represent basic sado-masochistic tendencies, for in love the subject
attempts to lose the self in the object, and in hate the subject
attempts to annihilate the object to maintain subjectivity. An
"authentic" relationship is as difficult to achieve as authentic existence, and human relations are more often seen as vascillating between the extremes of attraction and repulsion.
A Sartrean framework is useful for investigating literary portrayals of interpersonal relationships. The power of "the look" has
been understood at least since the ancient Egyptian depiction of the
eye and the Greek myth of the Gorgon Medusa. It is also a frequent
motif in modern German literature, in works of writers such as
E.T.A. Hoffmann, Biichner, Hauptmann, and Kafka. The present investigation is devoted to Thomas Mann's short story entitled "Tobias Mindernickel" (1897), which serves as paradigmatic illustration
not only of the gaze but also of the resulting sadomasochistic actions
of an individual in extreme isolation. For the protagonist, a dog is
an "ideal lover" in that it is free, yet dependent, a fact that elicits
103
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a love/hate response on the part of the master, analogous to other
often-noted polarities in the works of Thomas Mann. Without wishing to make Thomas Mann into an "existentialist," I would suggest
that the interpersonal relations portrayed in the story are illustrative of Sartre's theory of "Being-for-Others" in Being and Nothingness, published nearly half a century later.'
The focus in the story "Tobias Mindernickel" is on the title
figure, who is sketched with the selectivity and linearity reminiscent
of the Novelle form. The protagonist is a Thomas Mannian outsider,
in this case not an artist but simply a loner, who lives in almost
total isolation from society. That the reader is given no direct
insight into the personality of the character is presumably due to
the fact that the narrator, in his ironic first-person stance, has no
access to the consciousness of the character he has created (although
that character's initials are identical with those of the author). The
narrator assumes the role of the external observer who then speculates on the internal processes of consciousness. Frequent occurrence of clauses such as "It seems that ... ," "He appeared as if ... ,"
"It is possible that ..." puts the actual assertion into a subordinate
clause, making it grammatically dependent upon the perceiving
consciousness, to whom the events appear as baffling as they do
to the reader and, apparently, also to the protagonist, who
seems to be a puzzle to himself. The narrator introduces his topic
as follows: "There was a story about this man; I tell it, because
it is both puzzling and sinister, to an extraordinary degree" (p. 51).
Since the narrator is ostensibly limited to observational statements, he gives a description of the physical appearance as a clue
to interiority: "Mindernickel's exterior was odd, striking, and provoking to laughter" (p. 51). Physical features are significant, for in
Sartrean thought the body is the primordial contact with the world;
it determines a psychic space and constitutes the totality of meaningful relations to the world (an aspect which receives even greater
emphasis in the writings of Merleau-Ponty). Indications in clothing, mannerisms, and furniture
that Mindernickel belongs to a
higher class of folk than that with which he is associated suggest
a discrepancy, a non-coincidence of appearance and reality, that the
pour-soi is what it is not and is not what it is. Mindernickel experiences a desire to relate to something outside the self, yet he is
hermetically sealed off, with access neither to society, nor to nature
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nor to the self. He has, apparently, never found a way to live,
for "there seems to be missing in him the natural superiority with
which the normal, perceptive individual looks out upon the phenomenal world. He seems to measure himself against each phenomenon and find himself wanting; his gaze shifts and falls and grovels before men and things" (p. 51). His state of isolation seems
total, and solipsism leads to monotony and despair, as he becomes
at least vaguely aware of the contingency of being.
In this situation of alienation, the encounter between self and
world is critical, and Sartre's discussion of Being-for-Others is
helpful in analyzing the nature of the relationships. For Sartre, selfconsciousness is pure interiority, and I cannot be an object for
myself. The Other is thus the mediator between me and myself, and
my being-for-myself depends upon my being-for-others. This selfother relation, however, is at its core one of conflict: "The Other is
presented in a certain sense as the radical negation of my experience,
since he is the one for whom I am not subject but object .... While
I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is
trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the
Other, the Other seeks to enslave me" (BN, p. 340). This is clearly
a reflection of Hegel's illustrious doctrine of master and slave.2
One means of enslavement is the gaze, and the Other is then the
one who looks at me and thus turns me into an object: "With
the Other's look the 'situation' escapes me .... I am no longer
master of the situation" (BN, p. 241). "The Other as a look is only
that my transcendence transcended" (BN, p. 239).
This power of the look is the reason, we are told, why Mindernickel rarely leaves his room. People make fun of him; children
laugh and mock, and adults come to the doors to look. He is an
object in the eyes of others, and further, he is an object for their
amusement and ridicule. Sartre discusses shame as the recognition
of oneself before the Other: Shame is "the recognition of the fact
that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and
judging" (BN, p. 237). "The alienation of myself, which is the act
of being-looked-at, involves the alienation of the world which I
organize" (BN, p. 239). One could turn back upon the Other so as
to make an object out of him and thus transcend the Other. Mindernickel, however, is unable to return the look of the others, but
instead keeps his eyes cast to the ground. For all the opaqueness
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of character, he is in their eyes transparent, naked, and exposed
as he walks: "He made no defence, glancing timidly round ... like
a man hurrying through a driving rain without an umbrella"
(p. 51). His being, so defined by their look, is in flight, pursued by
the Other. This defenseless state is accompanied by fear as well
as by shame, and even when others laugh in his face, he greets
with humble politeness. Fear, for Sartre, "implies that I appear to
myself as threatened by virtue of my being a presence in the world"
(BN, p. 264). "We resign ourselves to seeing ourselves through the
Other's eyes. ... We cause our body to be designated for us as it
is for the Other by utilizing these designations to denote our body
as it is for us" (BN, p. 330). Mindernickel is acutely and constantly
aware of his body not as it is for him but as it is for the Other.
He has so thoroughly internalized the opinion of others that it
is not dependent upon the presence of an observer: "Further on,
when the children had stopped behind and he was not known, and
scarcely noted, his manner did not change. He still hurried on, still
stooped, as though a thousand mocking eyes were on him" (p. 52).
Sartre discusses the state of being-looked-at in the absence of an
observer, when "the Other is present everywhere, below me, above
me, in the neighboring rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly
my being-for-others" (BN, p. 253). This explains why Mindernickel
has no perception of the world, of nature or of people, for, as
Sartre notes: "We can not perceive the world and at the same time
apprehend a look fastened upon us; it must be either one or the
other. This is because to apprehend a look is to be conscious of
being looked at. The look which the eyes manifest is a pure reference to myself" (BN, pp. 234-35).3
In contrast to this object status, an episode is related in which
Tobias acts as a free subject. When a child receives a mild injury
at the hands of playmates, Tobias steps in to help. In the first
instance of direct discourse in the story, one hears him expressing
sympathy and giving something of himself (if only a handkerchief)
to another human being, who is in this case an object because of
his momentarily helpless states. This assertion of free subjectivity
is so gratifying to him that he can now look people in the eye:
"His eyes looked larger and brighter, he looked squarely at people
and things" (p. 53). However temporary the new self-image may
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be, one surmises that it gave impetus to his decision to restructure
the self-other relations in his life.
One does not know his intentions when, one Sunday morning,
he takes a walk along an elegant promenade and there buys a
dog. He seems nervous about this "project upon the world" and
walks around the dog three times, keeping his eyes fixed on him.
After the transaction is completed, Tobias pulls on the line, glancing fearfully about, and amid the laughter of observers he finally
gets the dog to his room, from which they scarcely depart. Here
begins the description of a subject-object confrontation which is,
at its core, sado-masochistic. Significantly, it is an animal that
plays the counterpart to Tobias. An adult relationship would,
presumably, be too threatening, and even in the case of the child,
Tobias was able to act as a subject only as long as the child was
injured, i. e. dependent. Not wishing to speculate on the consciousness of animals, one can at least say that they are not selfconscious. 4 As part of the natural world, animals apparently experience no conflict between being and consciousness (which may be
the reason they photograph so well). Perhaps even a cat would be
too strong a subject for Tobias (as it was for BUchner's Lenz);
but a dog's allegiance is unquestionable and the desire to please
nearly insatiable, so emotionally dependent is a dog upon his

master. 6
To escape the terrible loneliness and anguish of solipsism, Tobias needs another subject that will freely love him, yet one that
will not be so free as to withdraw that love. Freedom must be
limited to the prescribed realm, for Tobias cannot love that which
he cannot control. The dog, as a free natural subject is capable of
being converted into a controllable cultural object and is thus an
"ideal lover" for Tobias free, yet dependent. Sartre writes, the
lover "wants to be loved by a freedom but demands that this
freedom as freedom should no longer be free .... He wants
this freedom to be captured by itself" (BN, p. 343). Although the
relationship in the story is non-sexual in the physical sense, it has
rightfully been said that all existence has a sexual significance and
that every sexual phenomenon has an existential significance.
Sartre finds three patterns of behavior possible in love: One may
lapse into indifference; one may turn to masochism, which is the
attempt to become a thing to be controlled by the other; or one

-

Published by New Prairie Press

5

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 2

STCL, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1978)

108

may turn to sadism, which entails trying to possess the other by
violence. Conflict is thus the inevitable basis of the love relationship.
Just as Tobias was victimized by others, he now makes the dog
a victim. His feeling of humiliation gives rise to aggression, and in
this inter-animal relationship he asserts all the subjectivity which
was denied him in inter-personal relationships. Sartre understands
sadism as "a refusal to be incarnated and a flight from all facticity
and at the same time an effort to get hold of the Other's facticity"
(BN, p. 375). It is not merely the will to dominate or the thirst
for power; rather, sadism is born from anxiety in the face of the
Other. "What the sadist seeks to appropriate is in actuality
the transcendent freedom of the victim. But this freedom remains
on principle out of reach" (BN, p. 381).8
The struggle of two warring subjectivities which began at the
moment of contact continues upon arrival at home, as Tobias
discovers that with the incentive of food he can control the dog.
As the dog becomes tired and does not obey, Tobias reacts by
striking him with a stick. Shortly thereafter, however, comes the
peripeteia as his emotions change from anger to contempt, to pity,
and to love. When the dog licks Tobias' face and boots, it is like
a caress, and Tobias virtually loses himself in emotion: "He pressed the dog passionately to his breast, his eyes filling with tears"
(p. 55). In this displacement of and substitution for human relations, Tobias gives to and receives from the dog the "love" which
was denied him in relations with others. His situation before the
Other be it man or dog is one of helplessness and sense of
inferiority. Sartre writes: "Masochism is a perpetual effort to
annihilate the subject's subjectivity by causing it to be assimilated
by the Other; this effort is accompanied by the exhausting and
delicious consciousness of failure so that finally it is the failure
itself which the subject ultimately seeks as his principle goal"
(BN, p. 355).9
The narration of direct discourse when Tobias addresses the
dog is reminiscent of his brief encounter with the child, and in
both cases the discourse has only emotive, no conceptual content,
as the speaker tries to awaken sympathy for his own despair. The
"dialogue" is, of course, a monologue, and Tobias personifies
the dog in order to have a conversation partner, speaking with
him as though he were human. Communication between man and
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animal is, of course, not unusual; what is exceptional is the totality and the exclusiveness of this mode of relating to the world
and, consequently, the impossibility of relating at all. There is
no indication that Tobias spoke with human beings or even with
the self. Internal processes seem to be on a preverbal, perhaps
pre-reflective level, and language for Tobias is not a live option
for self-expression. In the absence of language, the "look" is all
the more revealing, for it also "speaks." At a time when he feels
dominant it is a "proud and angry look," and for comparison the
narrator conjures up the image of Napoleon with the illusion (delusion) of grandeur. His eyes later fill with tears, language breaks
down, and with "mild eyes" he speechlessly gazes at the dog (p. 55).
The dominance relations develop with increasing intensity and
constant power shifts. Tobias devotes total time and attention to
the care of his pet, who is known as "Esau" (which name perhaps
contains a reference to the biblical Esau, whose birthright, i.e. right
to existence, was appropriated by the other). Tobias, quite understandably, has no desire to appear with the dog in public. The resulting confinement is restrictive for the animal, but it is precisely
in this state of "shared isolation" that Tobias can maintain the
subject-object dependence which seemingly fulfills his dual desire
to give up the self to another and to dominate another. When the
dog lies beside Tobias on the sofa and gazes at him with soft, melancholy eyes, Tobias is pleased. When, on the other hand, the
dog demonstrates his natural vitality and independence, Tobias
becomes insecure; this state produces a psychological feeling of
distance and an emotional response of anger. "Then Tobias followed
his motions from afar with a helpless, disapproving, wandering look
and a hateful, peevish smile" (p. 56). This leads to violence, and on
one occasion when the dog escapes out the door, causing Tobias to
make a public spectacle of himself, the beating is especially hard.
Sartre discusses hate, which "implies a recognition of the Other's
freedom.... The occasion which arouses hate is simply an act by
the Other which puts me in the state of being subject to his freedom. This act is in itself humiliating; it is humiliating as the concrete revelation of my instrumental objectness in the face of the
Other's freedom" (BN, p. 387).
As Esau one day is "accidentally" injured (by running into the
knife with which Tobias is cutting the animal's food), the master
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is greatly alarmed; yet, the narrator relates, "a gleam of relief and
happiness came over his face" (p. 56). With the injured dog in a
state of dependence, Tobias can maintain the subject role, and he
cares for the "invalid" day and night. As Esau begins to recover,

however, Tobias becomes progressively more restless, and he no
longer nurses the wound, perhaps subconsciously wishing it would
not heal. He feels the other escaping him and senses that he cannot
fully possess him. When Esau has fully recovered and is again experiencing the joy of life, it is then the catastrophe occurs. Significantly, it is at a moment when Tobias attempts to be near the
dog that he is rejected, as the dog snaps at the hand which would
have stroked him. A conglomerate of emotions fear, hate, and
contempt well up within him, and Tobias, with a "sidelong,
jealous, and angry look" takes the knife, and all is over. Tobias
goes so far as to kill the dog in order to establish the dominance
relations.
The intentionality of the act is in this case a difficult question.
Although his actions are clearly directional, he seems to be so little
aware of his own ambivalent emotions that the results are surprising to him and at once wanted and unwanted. Even on the occasion
of the first beating, it was as if some unknown force in a schizoid
personality had taken control over what the reader and the protagonist knew to be "Tobias," and in the final act his movements
are termed "mechanical." Repetition of the penultimate scene in the
denouement, in which he wounds the dog in exactly the same place,
indicates both the intentionality and the blindness of his motivation: when the dog is accidentally injured, he nurses him back
to health; but finding the object thus to be escaping him, he
injures him again mortally. Perhaps the "ideal" state would be
some minimal form of existence in which the dog remained alive
but was totally dependent upon the other. Since such a condition
of stasis cannot be prolonged in a living organism, Tobias has to
kill to make permanent the object position of the Other. Sartre
discusses this means of attempting to get hold of the Other's freedom: "If I killed him I would in a way possess him, but since he
would no longer be free, this would not satisfy me. He would have
escaped me in the end, by dying. On the other hand, if he is still
free, then he necessarily escapes me" (BN, p. 380).10
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Since Tobias seems not to understand his own emotions, he
neither chooses his responses nor accepts responsibility for the
consequences. He utters a final monologue of "sympathy" (in quotation marks, since the possibility of syn-pathos, i.e. "feeling together," is annihilated by the solipsism that dooms him to the windowless prison of the self). The dog dies like a sacrificial lamb, "his
clouded, questioning eyes directed upon his master, with a look of
complaint, innocence, and incomprehension" (p. 57). Tobias lays
his face on Esau's body and "weeps bitter tears." The last phrase
may have biblical undertones, for Peter, the prototypical betrayer,
also "wept bitterly." One surmises that Peter, like Tobias, must
have been a puzzle to himself, feeling both an attraction to another
being and a repulsion as that being escaped him. Tobias, who had
died a thousand deaths in the eyes of others, tried to restructure
his relationship to the world. His failure is as total as that attempt
in the opposite direction of Kafka's Josef K., who, having given up
his subjectivity, dies like a dog. The problem of how to reconcile
conflicting free choices seems not to admit of solution.

NOTES
Thomas Mann, Gesammelte Werke; Vol. VIII Erzdhlungen (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1960), pp. 141-151. Jean-Paul Sartre, L'etre et le ;leant. Essai
d'ontologie phenomenologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1943). Citations are made
from the following translations: Thomas Mann, Stories of Three Decades,
trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), pp. 51-57. JeanPaul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essays on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: The Citadel Press, 1965). Page numbers are indicated in the text (the latter with the designation BN).
2 See Phdnomenologie des Geistes, Chapter IV.A., "Herrschaft und
Knechtschaft" for Hegel's discussion of dominance and subjection. Thomas
Mann almost certainly knew this source, and scholarship has also demonstrated Sartre's dependence on Hegel.
3 Similar themes occur throughout the early works of Thomas
Mann. In "Der kleine Herr Friedemann" the narrator renders the thoughtprocesses of the protagonist as follows: "Wie sie ihn angesehen hatte! Wie?
Sie hatte ihn gezwungen, die Augen niederzuschlagen? Sie hatte ihn mit ihrem
Brick gedemiitigt?" ... "Lag nicht noch immer ihr Blick auf ihm? Aber nicht
vie zuletzt, leer und ohne Ausdruck, sondern wie vorher, mit dieser zitternden Grausamkeit.... Konnte sie, wenn sie ihn durchschaute, nicht ein wenig
Mitleid mit ihm haben?" (VIII, pp. 90 and 97). The self's view of the self is
topicalized in "Der Bajazzo": "Ich bin nicht imstande, mich mit anderen
Augen anzusehen als mit denen der `Leute' " (VIII, p. 138). The power of
the Other's look is, of course, dependent upon one's self-conception, and the
narrator in "Luischen" offers the following evaluation: "Kein Anblick ist
haBlicher als derjenige eines Menschen, der sich selbst verachtet, der aber
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aus Feigheit und Eitelkeit dennoch liebenswiirdig sein und gefallen miichte"
(VIII, p. 170). The consequences are portrayed in "Der Weg zum Friedhof,"
where the narrator remarks: "Selbstverachtung und Laster aber stehen in
der schauderhaftesten Wechselbeziehung" (VIII, p. 190).
4 Heidegger writes: "Animals are as they are, without their standing from their Being as such in the truth of Being and preserving in
such standing what is essentially their Being. Presumably, animals are the
most difficult of all entities for us to think of, because we are, on the one
hand, most akin to them and, on the other hand, they are, at the same time
separated from our ex-sistential essence by an abyss." Martin Heidegger,
"Letter on Humanism," trans. Edgar Lohner, in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Richard M. Zaner and Don Ihde (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1973), p. 155.
5 The narrator of "Lenz" relates the following episode: "Einst saB
er [Lenz] neben Oberlin, die Katze lag gegeniiber auf einem Stuhl. Plotzlich
wurden seine Augen starr, er hielt sie unverriickt auf das Tier gerichtet; dann
glitt er langsam den Stuhl herunter, die Katze ebenfalls: sie war wie bezaubert von seinem Blick, sie geriet in ungeheure Angst, sie straubte sich scheu;
Lenz mit den namlichen Torten, mit fiirchterlich entstelltem Gesicht; wie
in Verzweiflung stilrzten beide aufeinander los." Georg Buchner, Werke und
Briefe: Gesamtausgabe, ed. Fritz Bergemann (Wiesbaden: Insel, 1958), p. 108.
6 Thomas Mann presents this conception of a dog in "Herr und
Hund."
L. Duroche, "Existential-Phenomenological Language
7 Leonard
Theory" (Manuscript). I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Duroche for his outstanding direction of the NEH Summer Seminar on
(Univ. of Minnesota, 1977), from which this
German Literary
paper arose.
8 Similarly, Erich Fromm in The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973) notes that sadism occurs
most frequently among frustrated individuals who feel powerless and have
little pleasure in life (p. 131). "It is transformation of impotence into the
experience of omnipotence" (p. 290). He sees sadism and masochism as two
facets of the "authoritarian character" (p. 292), for whom all relationships
are vertically structured, with submission to "superiors" and dominance over
"inferiors." See also, T. W. Adorno et al., The Authorian Personality (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1950). It would go without saying, were it not for
prevalent misconceptions, that the attempt in this paper is not to describe
psychotic behavior but rather to understand character traits present to
varying degrees in common humanity.
of the authoritarian personality, particularly as it is
9 Aspects
related to socio-political structures, are investigated in the following essay:
Gunter ReiB, "Herrenrecht: Bemerkungen zum Syndrom des Autoritaren
in Thomas Manns friihen Erzahlungen," in Gedenkschrift fiir Thomas Mann,
ed. Rolf Wiecher (Kopenhagen: Verlag Text & Kontext, 1975), pp. 67-94.
"Luischen," Amra, more or
10 In Thomas Mann's story entitled
less intentionally, causes her husband's death through humiliation; or, seen
the other way around, he, more or less intentionally, lets himself be so
humiliated. Similar themes occur in "Anekdote" and, with a reversal of roles,
in "Ein Gluck." On a different conceptual level one is reminded of the ruminations of BUchner's Leonce concerning which is preferable, a live or a dead
lover, with the conclusion: "Ich will deine Leiche lieben" (Buchner, "Leonce
und Lena," I.iii., op. cit., p. 122).
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